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I.  Introduction And Overview 
a. Goal of this Guide 
Post conflict countries often consider introducing plea bargaining to address 
serious problems of case backlogs and prolonged pretrial detention.  This 
memorandum is based on a query to the INPROL community seeking best 
practices and lessons learned from countries that have introduced plea 
bargaining into existing legal systems.  Specifically, the query sought 
information on: 
• Advantages and disadvantages of plea bargaining  
• The legislative drafting process including who should lead and be 
included in the process;  
• The content of legislation;  
• Implementing legislation including training and education 
requirements and challenges encountered; and   
• Monitoring and adjustments including how best to detect and solve 
problems in operationalizing plea bargaining 
 
b. Introduction 
Criminal justice systems around the world face overwhelming caseloads and 
ever-increasing pressure to handle more.  This pressure can be even more 
serious in post-conflict countries that face additional problems such as 
limited resources and fragile political environments.  In overloaded criminal 
justice systems it may be difficult, if not impossible, to hold trials for every 
accused person in a timely way.  As a result, countries are increasingly 
looking to alternative processes to handle criminal cases beyond traditional 
formal trials.  Plea bargaining is frequently considered as a possible solution 
to problems of case backlogs, long periods of pretrial detention, and to help 
address other serious human rights abuses resulting from a poorly 
functioning criminal justice system. Plea bargaining may help to alleviate 
some of these problems.  However, in countries that have not previously used 
plea bargains, this kind of reform is a serious change in the legal system and 
should be carefully considered in the overall context of the existing criminal 
justice system.   
 
To aid post-conflict countries that are considering reforming their criminal 
procedure to allow for shortened processes, the memo will (1) define plea 
bargaining and another commonly used shortened process, abbreviated trials 
(2) explain the advantages of plea bargaining (3) discuss the disadvantages of 
plea bargaining including examples of unintended negative consequences of 
introducing plea bargaining (4) discuss best practices in the legislative 
drafting process, including the need for thorough assessment before engaging 
in legislative reform and specific legislative provisions drafters should 
INPROL - International Network to Promote the Rule of Law	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consider in the legislative drafting phase (5) this memorandum will conclude 
with a discussion of the importance of monitoring plea bargaining after 
adoption which may lead to possible further legislative reforms adjusting the 
law to respond to concerns arising from how plea bargaining is working in 
practice.   
 
II. Plea Bargaining and Abbreviated Trials 
a. Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is a process to negotiate the resolution of a criminal case 
without a trial, most often carried out between the prosecution and defense. 
Comparative analysis of plea bargaining illustrates a diverse array of practice. 
Plea bargaining may include charge bargaining, where the prosecution may 
agree to dismiss or reduce the criminal charges in exchange for a plea of 
guilty.  Plea bargaining can also include sentence bargaining where the 
prosecutor will agree to a certain sentence which may include a fine or prison 
time, in exchange for a plea of guilty.  Some plea bargaining systems allow 
both sentence and charge bargaining and some limit it to sentence 
bargaining.  In addition to requiring the defendant plead guilty, some 
systems allow the prosecution to ask the defendant to cooperate in the 
investigation and prosecution of other crimes in return for reductions to the 
charge or sentence. While plea bargaining is often a process negotiated 
between the prosecution and defense, the judge usually needs to agree to the 
plea deal, and in some systems the victim of the crime may need to be 
informed. Furthermore, some systems allow plea bargaining directly between 
the defense and the judge, without prosecutorial involvement.  If this type of 
plea bargaining is allowed the plea bargain is generally limited to a sentence 
bargain.  Depending on the seriousness and complexity of the case, plea 
negotiations can be simple and fast or complex and drawn out. 
 
United States: Almost Anything Goes 
The United States has used plea bargaining since the time it was a 
British colony.  Plea bargaining came into use in a significant 
number of cases in the 20th Century, and by the 21st Century well 
over 90% of all resolved criminal cases in the United States are 
resolved through plea bargains.  There are very few rules 
surrounding the use of plea bargaining either in individual states or 
at the federal level.  The United States does not limit the kind of case 
that can be plea bargained, allowing it for the most minimal 
misdemeanor up to the most serious felony, including potential death 
INPROL - International Network to Promote the Rule of Law	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b. Abbreviated Trials 
Another common other alternative process that allows for quicker case 
resolution in lieu of a trial is an abbreviated trial. An abbreviated trial is a 
shortened procedure whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty; the judge 
reviews the evidence, including the defendant’s guilty plea, and gives the 
defendant a statutorily determined reduced sentence upon a finding of guilt.  
What distinguishes the abbreviated trial from plea bargaining is that the law 
does not provide for or require negotiation between the prosecutor and the 
defense regarding either the charge or the sentence.  Instead, in abbreviated 
trials, the criminal procedure code states what sentence reduction is given in 
exchange for a guilty plea and the defendant’s waiver of his right to a full 
trial.  Countries that allow for abbreviated trials often restrict the use of this 
process to less serious offenses. 
 
penalty cases. In general, a guilty plea must be voluntary and 
intelligent.  This means a defendant should understand what they are 
doing in agreeing to a plea bargain, should agree to accept the plea 
deal, and acceptance should not be due to physical coercion or 
prosecutors promising a deal and then changing the terms after the 
defendant has agreed and entered a plea of guilty.  There are also 
rules regarding how guilty pleas should be entered in court, 
specifying which rights a defendant must waive and the process of 
entering the plea. For example a defendant must state clearly on the 
record that they understand they are giving up their right to a trial.  
For all practical purposes there are no rules surrounding how plea 
deals are negotiated.  Individual prosecutors may be limited by their 
office’s or supervisor’s policies, but these limits are not binding or 
generally applied.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys are required to 
follow an ethical code of conduct, but these codes tend to be broadly 
worded and do not address plea bargaining directly.  As a result, U.S. 
prosecutors enjoy wide latitude and power in the plea bargaining 
process and can agree to dismiss a case outright, or dismiss charges, 
allow an alternative sentence, such as a fine or community service, or 
negotiate a deal that includes a substantial amount of time in prison. 
Russia: Abbreviated Trials 
Russia uses a system of abbreviated trials.  The 2001 Russian 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) limited abbreviated trials to 
INPROL - International Network to Promote the Rule of Law	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IV. Advantages of Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining offers advantages in addition to the often-stated hope that it 
will reduce case backlogs and increase efficiency in the criminal justice 
system.  Although this section will examine the advantages of plea bargaining 
in isolation, plea bargaining is rarely discussed as a stand-alone reform.  
Because of the way plea bargaining works and how interconnected it is to the 
rest of the criminal justice system, it is better if the question of whether to 
adopt plea bargaining is considered not in isolation but as part of the other 
proposed or already adopted changes to the criminal justice system. This 
holistic analysis of whether to adopt plea bargaining in a given country 
should include human rights concerns and the particular goals of the reform 
package.   That being said, there are generally three major advantages to plea 
bargaining:  it can ease docket overcrowding and case backlogs; it is a useful 
tool for complex prosecutions; and it allows for more creative, individualized, 
and possibly noncustodial sentences. 
 
a. Overcrowded Dockets and Case Backlogs 
The most often cited reason for adopting plea bargaining is that it allows for 
efficient handling of cases. Trials, whether by jury or not, can take 
considerable time and resources.   Plea bargaining can decrease the need for 
countless court appearances, hearings, and the days spent in trial.  In some 
systems, such as in the United States, a plea bargain can be reached on the 
same day that the charges are filed.  In the United States this first court 
appearance and the filing of charges often happens within forty-eight hours 
defendants facing a maximum of five years imprisonment.i  Russia 
seems to have adopted abbreviated trials due to concern that newly 
reintroduced jury trials for more serious crimes would require more 
court time and further crowd the courts.ii  In 2003, the Russian 
legislature amended the CPC and expanded the list of cases that 
would be eligible for abbreviated trials to include charges with a 
maximum punishment of up to ten years imprisonment.iii  The 
Russian CPC allows a judge to sentence the defendant to a maximum 
of two-thirds of the sentence allowable under the law if the case is 
resolved through an abbreviated trial.iv  If the defendant, prosecutor, 
victim, or judge objects to an abbreviated trial, it will not proceed.v   
Officially there is no negotiation under the Russian abbreviated trial 
system, however it is likely some unofficial negotiation takes place to 
secure the approval of all parties to the use of an abbreviated trial in 
the particular case. 
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of arrest.  This represents a significant savings of time and resources to the 
court system, prosecutors, and individual defendants.   
 
Greater efficiency not only saves resources, but can contribute to increased 
access to justice and greater public trust in the legal system. Justice delayed 
can be justice denied if defendants and victims are waiting for years for their 
“day in court,” particularly in less serious cases. Reducing court time spent 
on each case can reduce overall court backlogs and mean that the cases can 
be heard more quickly. People are more likely to respect and to use a justice 
system when they know their case will be resolved in a timely manner. 
 
Moreover, increasing court efficiency can improve human rights practice. 
Overcrowded courts can create serious human rights problems, particularly 
in countries without developed bail systems or other procedures to release 
defendants from custody pending trial.vi  In many systems the average 
criminal case takes months or years to go to trial, leaving the average 
defendant to spend that time in custody, even where the charges are not 
serious.  This can lead to serious human rights violations on two fronts. First, 
where charges against the accused are minor, time spent in prison awaiting 
trial may exceed the maximum possible sentence for the alleged crime. 
Second, pretrial detention facilities in many countries have notoriously poor 
conditions such as overcrowding, poor hygiene, poor nutrition, disease, and 
lack of physical safetyvii  – all of which are made worse by large numbers of 
pretrial detainees. Processing cases more quickly can reduce the amount of 
time defendants spend in pretrial detention and ultimately the amount of 
time they spend in detention overall.  This can have a substantial impact on 
reducing excessive detention, lightening the load on overburdened prison 
systems, improving poor prison conditions and reducing the time defendants 
spend waiting for trials. 
 
Republic of Georgia:  The Fix May not be Quick: 
Adopting plea bargaining is not necessarily a quick fix to the problem 
of case backlogs and prolonged pre-trial detention.  The experience of 
the Republic of Georgia illustrates that it may take years to see 
reductions in case loads and backlogs. In 2003, Georgia amended its 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to introduce plea bargaining as part 
of a package of anticorruption legislation. Under this law, pleas were 
used solely in corruption cases. This approach limited the impact that 
plea bargaining had on reducing case backlogs as well as leading to 
serious criticism of the practice.   The press in Georgia actively 
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b. Tool for Complex Prosecutions 
Plea bargains can be a useful tool in fighting complex crimes - like corruption 
and organized crime - that so often paralyze post-conflict legal systems.  
Organized crime and corruption cases can be difficult to prosecute as many 
layers of lower-level players often shield ringleaders.  If a prosecutor can 
convince a lower-level player to agree to testify against those in charge, the 
prosecutor may be able to gather enough evidence to successfully prosecute 
people higher up the chain of command. Where the law allows, plea bargains 
can be one of the most effective ways to encourage a lower-level player to 
testify. Following an arrest prosecutors can offer a reduced sentence or to 
drop the charges entirely in exchange for incriminating testimony, 
information, or other forms of cooperation. For example, U.S. sentencing 
guidelines allows cooperating witnesses to get a reduced sentence in 
exchange for cooperation,viii and a significant number of defendants in the 
federal system take advantage of this.ix   
 
Where plea bargaining laws make this tool available, prosecutors may be 
slow to use it.  For example, laws adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
reported on the early cases, which included large payments by 
defendants to avoid criminal convictions. These high-profile cases 
created a perception that pleas were another form of corruption in an 
already corrupt legal system. This perception was extremely 
damaging to public confidence in plea bargaining.  Georgia 
responded to these concerns with amendments to the law in 2004, 
and again in 2005. The amendments expanded the use of plea 
bargaining to other offenses and provided additional human rights 
protections.  The revised law allowed prosecutors and defendants to 
engage in charge or sentence bargaining.   
Today, the CPC does not limit plea bargaining to particular types of 
offenses or set a limit on maximum possible sentences. In 2005 the 
law was amended to prevent officials from accepting payments of 
fines alone to terminate criminal prosecutions.  In the first two years 
after adopting plea bargaining 12.7% of criminal cases were resolved 
through plea bargaining.  This number increased to over 50% five 
years after plea bargaining was adopted.  Now, over ten years after 
its initial adoption, plea bargaining reportedly resolves 95% of all 
criminal cases, helping to reduce case backlogs and prison 
overcrowding.  
INPROL - International Network to Promote the Rule of Law	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Georgia allowed prosecutors to offer better deals to defendants who agreed to 
cooperate. In both countries prosecutors were initially hesitant to use plea 
bargaining in this way, but its use grew over time. In Bosnia, use increased as 
prosecutors gained familiarity with the advantages of using cooperating 
witnesses to build complex cases.x  Georgia, as in many places, faced the 
additional barrier of a cultural bias against “snitching.”  However, in recent 
years, Georgia seems to have overcome this bias. This may be due, in part, to 
changes in the law that limited possible non-custodial sentences.  This has 
meant agreeing to cooperate is often the only way for defendants to avoid 
prison time. 
 
c. Creative, Noncustodial, and Individualized 
Sentences 
The third reason for introducing plea bargaining is one that is rarely 
discussed but is perhaps its greatest value:  it may provide greater flexibility 
in sentencing, allowing the prosecution and defense to construct more 
individualized sentences through the informal negotiation process.  If the 
specific plea bargaining system does not limit the negotiation parameters, 
and if the particular legal system allows for it, it is possible that those within 
the criminal justice system will be able to use plea bargaining as a way to 
innovate and use alternative sentencing. 
 
United States: Innovative Sentencing though Flexible Plea Bargains   
Due to the lack of formal rules in plea bargaining, all that is needed to 
try a new approach in the U.S. criminal justice system is for 
professionals in the system agree to it.  This means that professionals 
can agree to try a new approach without waiting to have the law 
changed to specifically allow for it.  The best example of this is the 
development of problem-solving courts such as drug courts, veterans’ 
courts, and mental health courts.  Problem solving courts are a 
combination of counseling and punishment.xi  The first drug court 
started in Dade County, Florida, in 1998 out of the collective 
frustration of several judges, prosecutors and the public defender 
with the traditional criminal justice system’s response to drug 
addiction.  Currently, drug courts are the fastest growing form of 
alternative dispute resolution within the U.S. criminal justice system.  
These courts would not have been able to develop as easily without 
the flexibility allowed by plea bargaining.  Due to plea bargaining, 
there was no need to wait for new legislation before starting the first 
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Increasing flexibility in sentencing has clear benefits, discussed in more 
detail in the Potential Penalties section below. However, it may be a poor fit 
in some legal cultures. Some legal systems, including many civil law systems, 
place a high value on treating defendants consistently. These systems may 
intentionally allow less variation and actively discourage individualized 
sentencing. Where this is true, it is likely that advocating plea bargaining on 
the grounds that it will allow for creativity in sentencing, or a more holistic 
approach to punishment, will be viewed with great suspicion by legal 
professionals. 
 
V. Disadvantages of Plea Bargaining 
In general, arguments against plea bargaining do not claim that the above 
stated advantages are overstated or incorrect, but rather that there are 
possible serious, negative unintended consequences that may arise if plea 
bargaining is introduced.   Plea bargaining cannot be separated from the legal 
and political system into which it is introduced and the informal, unregulated 
nature of plea negotiation makes the practice vulnerable to abuse in the 
context of weaker legal systems. Countries facing larger governance and rule 
of law deficits like widespread corruption, poor respect for human rights, or 
lack of independence in the judiciary may find that plea bargaining reflects, 
and in some cases amplifies these problems.  
 
Experience in other countries has identified several specific unintended 
consequences resulting from adopting plea bargaining, including disparate 
sentencing; penalizing defendants who go to trial; violations of defendants’ 
rights; encouraging coercion of confessions; contributing to a negative public 
perception of the legal system; plea bargaining’s failure to focus on truth-
telling; possible failures to implement the new process; and how plea 
bargaining may work alongside informal justice processes. Serious 
consideration should be given to which unintended consequences are most 
likely given the conditions in the particular country and what measures can 
drug court. Being able to try new approaches without legislation has 
also made the process of passing legislation easier as these courts 
often have established a track record that can then be brought to the 
state legislature to explain the value of establishing of drug courts or 
other problem solving courts.   This advantage may not be so easily 
realized in systems with sentencing guidelines or that mandate 
prison sentences or otherwise limit the possibility of using alternative 
sentences. 
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be taken to minimize the negative unintended consequences if plea 
bargaining is introduced. 
 
a. Disparate Sentencing 
Plea bargaining is based on informal negotiations.  For plea bargaining to 
function, prosecutors need to have the discretion to decide when to offer plea 
bargains and what the offer should include. This can lead to different legal 
outcomes for otherwise similarly situated defendants. Some variation in 
sentencing is inevitable, even where all parties have followed the law and 
acted in good faith in negotiating pleas. However, plea bargaining can be 
used to cover disparate sentencing due to systemic problems like political 
interference in the legal system or corruption.  
 
Regardless of the underlying causes, discrepancies in sentencing can give rise 
to perceptions of an unfair or unjust legal system.  This is especially 
problematic in post-conflict countries where divisions between groups are 
deep and tensions among them are high. If individuals from powerful groups 
get better plea deals than those in less powerful groups it can cause the less 
powerful groups to see the justice system as biased against them or unfair.  
Where disparate sentencing is a concern, legislation can reduce prosecutorial 
discretion by limiting the amount that sentences may be reduced, or limiting 
plea bargaining to sentence bargaining alone, rather than allowing 
prosecutors to negotiate charges.   
 
b. Trial Penalty 
Where criminal codes contain high potential sentences, a defendant who 
choses to reject a plea deal and go to trial faces a substantial risk that, if 
convicted, they will receive a significantly heavier penalty than if they had 
taken the plea deal. This “trial penalty” is a common criticism of plea 
bargaining as practiced in the United States.  While supporters of plea deals 
consider a lower sentence to simply be a justifiable “inducement” or “reward” 
to encourage defendants to plead guilty, critics say it creates a coercive 
atmosphere for plea bargaining. This is particularly worrisome for innocent 
defendants who may be discouraged from exercising their right to have their 
case heard in a full trial.  
 
The potential for coercion and other problems posed by a trial penalty may be 
addressed at least in part in the legislative process.  For example, plea 
bargaining legislation could limit how much prosecutors can reduce a 
sentence as part of a plea bargain.  This is similar to the approach taken by 
countries that have adopted abbreviated trials rather than plea bargaining.  
Limiting use of plea bargaining to less serious offenses that carry lower 
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possible sentences would also help to prevent the trial penalty.   Another 
approach could be for plea bargaining legislation to require that the sentence 
offered in a plea negotiation act as a cap, setting the maximum possible 
sentence at trial.xii  However, reformers should be aware that attempts to 
remedy “trial penalties” may themselves have unintended consequences. 
Using a plea bargaining offer as a sentence caps, for example, may reduce in 
practice how much the discount prosecutors offer in negotiations, as they 
know that plea offer will become the maximum sentence after trial. 
 
c. Violations of Defendants’ Rights 
Post-conflict countries can find it challenging to guarantee basic trial rights 
to criminal defendants.  Countries introducing plea bargaining risk further 
entrenching currently existing bad practices unless the introduction is done 
with a full understanding of the most commonly violated defendants’ rights 
and with a realistic plan and procedures in place to ensure those rights are 
not further violated through the plea bargaining process. Pitting trained 
prosecutors against defendants with little legal knowledge in an informal plea 
negotiation can put a defendant in a vulnerable position. Recognizing this, 
most plea bargaining legislation contains some protections for defendants’ 
rights – most commonly requiring judges to ensure that defendants 
understand and voluntarily agreed to the plea. 
 
However, for a variety of reasons from unfamiliarity with the law to political 
interference, judges and prosecutors may not carefully observe these 
protections. For this reason, it is important that defendants are represented 
by a lawyer in the plea bargaining process. Protections should be included in 
legislation and resources should be put into place to guarantee the right to a 
lawyer and that the lawyer has a meaningful role in the plea bargaining 
process.   
 
Although plea bargaining can be practiced in a way that respects defendants’ 
rights it is important to note that even the best written plea-bargaining 
legislation and access to defense counsel cannot correct systemic problems. It 
is unrealistic to expect a criminal justice system that marginalizes defense 
counsel or fails to adequately protect defendants’ rights at other stages of the 
proceedings to not have the same problems in the plea bargaining stage. 
There is no reason to expect safeguards written into plea bargaining 
legislation alone to protect defendants in criminal justice systems suffering 
from these systemic problems. 
 
INPROL - International Network to Promote the Rule of Law	  
14 
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rights Violations in Plea Bargaining   
In 2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a new Criminal Procedure 
Code (CPC) moving from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial 
system, thereby changing the role of lawyers and judges.xiii The 
drafters of the new CPC apparently added plea bargaining primarily 
to address case backlogs and court overcrowding. Article 231 of the 
CPC specifically allows negotiation between the accused, the defense 
lawyer, and the prosecutor on the “conditions of admitting guilt.” 
Article 231(2) of the CPC allows the prosecutor to “propose a sentence 
of less than the minimum prescribed by the law.”  Article 231(4)(a) of 
the CPC requires the court to “ensure” that there is sufficient evidence 
and that the accused enters into the plea “voluntarily, consciously 
and with understanding.” The Code did not limit plea bargaining to 
any particular offenses but did limit it to sentence bargaining.  The 
court was also required to notify the victim about the plea deal.   
As the new code was implemented, monitoring of plea bargaining 
revealed that problems present in the larger criminal justice system 
carried over into plea bargaining.  These problems included unequal 
bargaining power between the prosecution and the defense, a failure 
to preserve the presumption of innocence, and lack of access to 
defense counsel.  Three years after plea bargaining was adopted a 
monitoring report indicated that 27% of defendants entered a guilty 
plea without a lawyer.xiv The report further noted “a trend among the 
judiciary that defense counsel is viewed as unnecessary during plea 
negotiating and plea agreement hearings.”xv This was an outgrowth 
of the general legal culture, particularly among judges, who looked to 
prosecutors to help unrepresented defendants rather than 
recognizing the role of a strong defense in an adversarial system.  
Defendants in 49-60% of cases entered a guilty plea before they knew 
what the sentence would be. xvi This meant there was no negotiation, 
and the guilty pleas were not the result of a “plea bargain.”  The 
failure to guarantee the right to a lawyer, the failure to negotiate, 
and the power imbalances in the process all reflected existing 
problems and attitudes in the legal system.  Plea bargaining merely 
continued existing practices and attitudes in the context of a new 
process. 
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d. Encouraging Coerced or False Confessions 
Related to the concern about violating defendants’ rights is the concern that 
plea bargaining could encourage continued routine coercion of confessions.  
Many post-conflict legal systems rely heavily on confessions by the defendant 
as evidence in a criminal trial.  Paired with a history of routinely heavy-
handed government tactics in securing confessions, plea bargaining may at 
best fail to encourage any change in the existing legal culture to prohibit or 
stop coerced confessions. At worst, it could encourage the continued reliance 
on confessions regardless of the method used to obtain them. In encouraging 
continued use of coerced confessions, plea bargaining could reinforce to a 
skeptical public the idea that the government continues to routinely violate 
basic rights. 
 
Even where coercion is not a concern, plea bargaining offers an incentive for 
defendants to admit guilt regardless of whether they committed the crime 
charged. As mentioned in relation to trial penalties, the offer of decreased 
charges or sentencing may be enough to convince innocent defendants to 
plead guilty, particularly in countries with high conviction rates or harsh 
punishments.  In addition, where prosecutors offer a deal in return for 
cooperation, defendants may offer exaggerated or falsified information to get 
a better plea agreement.  
 
e. Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining itself can also contribute to a public perception that the legal 
system is corrupt and that powerful people are not bound by the law.   Plea 
bargaining is most often an informal negotiation behind closed doors and 
with little transparency.  From the outside, this process can look like the 
same informal, extralegal practices commonplace in countries that are highly 
corrupt.  
 
This perception can be made worse when plea bargaining is introduced close 
in time to the introduction of previously unknown or unused alternative 
sentences.  Although creative sentencing can be a positive aspect of plea 
bargaining, where plea bargaining commonly results, or is perceived to 
result, in little or no jail time, it can look like defendants are negotiating their 
way out of criminal responsibility. The risk is particularly high where pleas 
are first introduced in high profile cases, such as corruption cases, and where 
defendants agree to pay fines in return for drastically reduced jail time or 
charges, or dismissal of the case altogether.  Introducing plea bargaining in 
this way may create the impression that pleas allow defendants to “pay their 
way” out of jail. This can have a serious impact on overall perceptions of the 
legal system, helping to reinforce existing lack of trust in legal institutions 
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and working against the development of the rule of law. 
 
 
 
f. Pleas Do Not Focus on “Truth-Telling” 
Criminal trials in civil law countries are often viewed as a truth-telling 
process.  Plea bargaining may not fit well in a legal culture that looks to 
formal trial processes to determine the truth of the events underlying a 
criminal case. At most, a plea bargain determines the charge and 
punishment.  It rarely contributes to a deeper understanding of the “truth” of 
the events of the crime itself.  Although a defendant may admit guilt, it may 
be for a variety of reasons, such as the desire to escape further jail time.  The 
defendant’s choice may have nothing to do with what actually happened, or 
even if the defendant actually committed the crime.  One of the key 
advantages of plea bargaining, that it shortens the process, may be seen as an 
important disadvantage in such legal cultures as plea bargaining may skip 
Nigeria: Negative Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining  
Nigeria provides an example of the importance of considering public 
reactions in deciding how to first introduce the use of plea 
bargaining.  In Nigeria, plea bargaining was first widely used in the 
context of a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign.  Beginning 
in 2005, a series of high level corruption cases were prosecuted 
during which plea deals were struck that allowed the defendants to 
have their charges withdrawn or reduced in exchange for pleading 
guilty and returning some of the stolen property.  These cases were 
widely criticized in the press due to the use of plea bargaining and the 
case outcomes.   One commentator decried the use of plea bargaining 
in these cases as it allowed defendants to escape prosecution by 
“sharing their loot with the state,” arguing that outcomes like this 
create an incentive “for more theft.”xvii   Commentators also 
contrasted the treatment of wealthy defendants who were accused of 
high-level corruption and escaped with no jail time with that of poor 
defendants convicted of low-level theft crimes who were serving time 
in prison.  These high level corruption cases introduced plea 
bargaining to the public and left the impression that plea bargaining 
was a tool for the wealthy and powerful to avoid justice and not a 
process that could be more widely used across the legal system to 
address problems such as case backlogs and long waits in pre-trial 
detention. 
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important steps that contribute to the truth-telling function of the criminal 
process.  Policymakers in legal cultures that place a premium on the truth-
telling function of trials may want to consider limiting plea bargaining to less 
serious offenses or look at alternative procedures, such as abbreviated trials, 
which include judicial review of the evidence in addition to the guilty plea 
itself. 
 
Plea bargaining’s shortened process may also be a problem for countries 
emerging from conflict. For many post-conflict countries establishing the 
truth about past crimes through the justice system is an important part of 
reconciliation. Using plea bargains in international and domestic courts 
trying serious conflict-related crimes may mean the justice system fails to 
fulfill this important role, which may delay or impede larger goals for societal 
reconciliation.xviii  
 
g. Failure to Implement 
Efforts to reconstruct or reform legal systems following conflict often include 
passing a number of new laws, many of which will be only partially 
implemented, if they are implemented at all. Failure to implement laws can 
happen for a variety of reasons. Two common reasons are a lack of support 
for the law among those who will need to implement it, such as legal 
professionals, and passing the law without providing for the necessary 
resources for implementation, such as salaries for new personnel.   
 
Lack of resources can be a major obstacle to implementation.  For new plea 
bargaining laws this problem frequently takes the form of insufficient access 
to defense lawyers. Some plea bargaining laws require a defense lawyer to 
negotiate the deal and be in court when the plea of guilty is taken.  If large 
numbers of defendants are unrepresented in criminal cases due to a shortage 
of defense lawyers, or a lack of funding to pay for their services, this can 
prevent plea bargains from being widely used. In South Africa, the practice of 
plea-bargaining was legally formalized in 2001.xix  The law requires that the 
accused have legal representation when entering plea and sentence 
agreements.xx Five years later, observers found this requirement, coupled 
with a lack of available legal aid attorneys made it impossible to use plea 
bargains in many cases.xxi  Besides preventing use of pleas, lack of defense 
counsel can lead to wide-spread violations of the protections written into the 
law, as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Failing to build support for plea bargaining laws prior to implementation can 
also create serious problems. In countries with no previous experience 
negotiating criminal cases, plea bargaining requires an important change in 
legal culture and the roles judges, prosecutors and lawyers play. Plea 
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negotiations require prosecutors and defense lawyers to meet on a more 
equal footing to discuss how to resolve a particular case. Plea bargaining also 
relies on the judge to act as a check on the prosecution, by examining plea 
deals to ensure defendants’ rights were protected. This is a dramatic change 
for prosecutors used to recommending a particular sentence and having the 
judge routinely follow those recommendations in full. If judges are still 
“rubber stamping” prosecutors’ recommendations, prosecutors will have 
little motivation to negotiate meaningfully with the defense. Instead, they can 
simply offer what they would have asked for after the trial, knowing that they 
will get what they want in the end. From the defendant’s perspective, if the 
prosecutor does not offer a better deal in exchange for the guilty plea, the 
defense may have no incentive to avoid a full trial.  A defense lawyer who 
knows that offers made during plea negotiations are essentially what the 
defendant will get after trial, and that the plea deal doesn’t offer any other 
advantages such as release from pre-trial detention, is unlikely to 
recommend that their client accept the deal.  
 
For plea bargaining to work, individual professionals within the system need 
to be ready and willing to change how they do their jobs. Otherwise, the new 
laws will be ignored, or partially implemented in a way that allows 
professionals to avoid major changes to their roles. It is far more likely that 
legal professionals will make these changes if they had knowledge of and 
supported plea bargaining reforms before they become law. Past efforts to 
introduce plea bargaining have included appropriate stakeholders such as 
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers in the reform process through 
trainings, debate, and the legislative drafting process. This will be discussed 
further in the Legislative Drafting section.  It is also important to recognize 
that implementation cannot be divorced from the larger political 
environment. If powerful political actors have an interest in maintaining a 
weak judiciary or defense bar, or where roles are deeply ingrained, involving 
stakeholders in training and debate may have little effect in improving 
implementation of plea bargaining.   
 
Serbia:  Failure to Implement 
In 2009 Serbia introduced plea bargaining for war crimes. In 2011 a 
new criminal procedure code entered into force, which allowed plea 
bargaining in all criminal cases.  The Criminal Procedure Code, in 
Articles 313-317, details what must be included in the plea agreement, 
the judge’s role in accepting the plea agreement, and the grounds to 
reject a plea agreement.  Article 313 requires a defense lawyer to be 
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g. The Informal Justice Sector 
Post-conflict countries with a tradition of using customary justice processes 
for criminal cases may face additional challenges in adopting and 
implementing plea bargaining.  Often the use of customary justice processes 
signals that the general public, or a significant part of the general public, does 
not trust the formal justice sector.   The formal justice sector may be viewed 
as corrupt, as removed from local sensibilities and solutions, and as failing to 
act due to chronic inefficiency.  By contrast, local customary justice actors 
such as village councils, chiefs, or elders, may be able to convene quickly, 
handle the cases in ways that the local culture finds appropriate, and be 
trusted for their integrity by local residents.  If plea bargaining is introduced 
it may be viewed as another example of the failure of the formal justice 
system, especially if the plea deals are seen to be out of step with how cases 
are handled in the customary justice system.  The question to consider is 
whether the informal justice sector helps to build legitimacy for the formal 
justice sector or whether it reinforces the existing lack of trust.  
 
A related concern is whether plea bargaining would be used as a way to 
justify taking cases out of the formal justice system and placing them in the 
informal sector in a way that causes harm to individual defendants.  There 
are circumstances where diverting cases out of the formal justice system may 
help individual defendants by allowing them to avoid a criminal record and 
prison.  However, customary justice processes can fail to adequately protect 
the rights of the accused, particularly women and minorities.  Customary 
processes often use “creative” sentencing which may include apologies, or 
payments to the victim of money or livestock.  However, informal justice 
sector processes have also ordered punishments that are themselves human 
rights violations, such as corporal punishment, or the most extreme examples 
of ordering gang rape. 
 
Diverting cases out of the formal criminal justice system may also be done in 
a way that fails to protect victims.  For example, in some countries sexual 
assault cases are referred out of the formal criminal justice system and into 
present “during the conclusion of the agreement.”  However, plea 
bargaining is not yet widely used in Serbia.  Reportedly, one problem 
is that there is still not a “culture of negotiation and direct 
communication” between prosecutors and defense lawyers.xxii   NGOs 
and international organizations have held trainings and round-
tables to try to work with prosecutors and defense lawyers to 
encourage greater use of this new process. 
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customary processes.  Unfortunately it is still all too common that police and 
prosecutors do not treat sexual assault or domestic violence cases as seriously 
as other violent crimes such as robbery.  Allowing diversion of criminal cases 
to informal processes can provide a convenient way for prosecutors, judges, 
or police officers, to avoid cases that are unpleasant or that they don’t 
consider to be serious offenses.xxiii    
 
As will be discussed below, if plea bargaining is adopted in countries with 
active informal justice sectors legislation should specifically address limiting 
or preventing plea bargaining cases out of the formal justice sector and into 
these customary processes.  This might also be an area to focus media or 
public information campaigns to explain to the general public the difference 
between plea bargaining and the informal justice sector. 
 
VI. Drafting Plea Bargaining Legislation 
The first step in any legislative drafting process should be to determine 
whether new laws or changes to existing law are necessary.  Only after the 
assessment and a determination to proceed should a country move into the 
actual legislative drafting phase. As has been discussed above, plea 
bargaining is generally discussed as part of a larger package of criminal 
procedure reforms and should be considered in the context of the legal and 
political system as a whole.   
 
a. Assessment 
Before beginning any legislative drafting process it is important for both 
domestic policymakers and international rule of law development assistance 
providers to first carefully assess how the criminal justice system works, 
including the current state of the laws.  An important part of this process is to 
define the goals of reform and understand the reasons that these goals have 
not yet been reached.  It is also important to assess public attitudes towards 
the legal system to avoid adopting a version of plea bargaining which will 
reinforce existing public mistrust of the formal legal system. 
 
The assessment should examine why plea bargaining is being proposed and if 
plea bargaining will help to achieve the intended goals.  Often the first and 
only reason offered for plea bargaining is to reduce case backlogs. This 
reason is sometimes given without a thorough assessment of the cause of the 
case backlogs.  Is the problem that defendants are not being brought to court 
or investigations are not being completed? Or is it that everything is ready 
and there is just no court time for trials?  If case backlogs are due to delayed 
investigations, introducing plea bargaining may not remedy the problem, as 
the investigation should be complete before the case is plea bargained.    
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The assessment should also try to determine if key stakeholders have other 
goals.  For example, do prosecutors want to use plea bargaining to assist in 
complex prosecutions?  Do defense lawyers and human rights NGOs want to 
use plea bargaining to encourage use of alternative sentencing?  Do key 
stakeholders, including rule of law assistance providers, hope that plea 
bargaining will help to further develop rule of law in the country?  
Understanding these various goals is important in understanding what type 
of plea bargaining legislation to consider and whether plea bargaining will 
help the justice system achieve the desired outcomes. 
 
Related to assessing the goals of key stakeholders is assessing the attitudes of 
the general public towards the legal system.  As examples from the Republic 
of Georgia and Nigeria illustrate, if the general public’s distrust of the legal 
system is not recognized and addressed, it can make the introduction of this 
new process more difficult.  Additionally, if customary justice processes are 
widely used, the assessment should examine attitudes towards these 
processes and how they relate to trust or lack of trust in the formal legal 
system.  Conducting this assessment can be tricky.  Opinion surveys can 
reach inaccurate conclusions depending on what questions are asked and 
how the survey is conducted.  This can be even more complicated where it is 
hard to conduct opinion surveys due to poor communication systems or 
where people may not give honest answers due to distrust of the survey 
process.  One simple way to assess public attitudes may be to assess how the 
media reports on the criminal justice system.  If the media focuses on stories 
of corruption it is likely this is having an impact and that the general public 
may view the criminal justice system as corrupt.  If the country has an active 
civil society, it may also help to survey or meet with NGOs to assess their 
opinions of the criminal justice system.  The goal should be to make an effort 
to understand the attitudes of the general public as part of the process of 
deciding what type of plea bargaining, if any, it makes sense for the current 
criminal justice system to adopt and to be aware of how taking one approach 
may help or hinder developing trust in the formal criminal justice system.   
 
The assessment should next strive to gather data about the number of cases 
going through the criminal justice system including the categories of 
offenses.  A key question in drafting plea bargaining legislation is whether 
plea bargaining will be limited to only certain kinds of offenses or available 
more widely.  Before deciding which cases should be eligible for plea 
bargaining it is important to know what kinds of cases constitute the largest 
percentage of cases going through the criminal justice system. In most 
criminal justice systems the vast majority of cases concern less serious 
offenses, such as lower level theft offenses and drug possession.  If that is the 
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situation, then introducing plea bargaining for a limited class of offenses, 
such as high-level corruption cases, will likely have little effect on reducing 
case backlogs.  Although it can be difficult to get good data in post-conflict 
criminal justice systems, it is important to have a clear idea of what is 
happening in the system and how plea bargaining can, or won’t, help before 
the process of legislative drafting begins.  Gathering data before plea 
bargaining is adopted is also important as collecting this kind of data gives a 
baseline for comparison. Without baseline data it is difficult to accurately 
monitor or evaluate the impact of a new plea bargaining law. 
 
b. Legislative Drafting 
Drafting new legislation is usually the first stage of adopting plea bargaining 
or abbreviated trials.  Legislative drafting should ideally involve bringing key 
stakeholders into the discussion process and giving them an opportunity to 
provide meaningful input.  Conferences, roundtables, and other events can 
give stakeholders including defense lawyers, NGOs, judges, and prosecutors 
an opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of introducing 
plea bargaining.  Organizing events to discuss plea bargaining may delay the 
legislative process, but ultimately result in legislation that is more likely to be 
implemented as the new process has not been “forced” on the legal system 
but instead has been more carefully drafted to reflect the legal culture and 
stakeholder goals.  
 
After plea bargaining got off to a rough start in Nigeria, a series of workshops 
and conferences were held to consider reform.  A wide cross section of the 
Nigerian legal community, including Judges, NGOs, legal associations, and 
academics attended these events. The Nigerian government also held public 
hearings and debates through the Law Reform Commission.  This two year 
process ended, in October 2013, with the passage of a new Criminal Justice 
Act which included major changes to plea bargaining.   
 
For reforms to last it is also important to include a wide cross section of the 
legal and NGO community. As time passes, political power may change 
hands. Including only are those currently in power may ultimately delay or 
derail the reform process. Georgia began discussions, roundtables, and 
trainings five years before the law was changed. The process included a broad 
range of actors from the legal and NGO community.  Following the 2003 
Rose Revolution, leadership in key government offices changed hands.  
However, many of those who assumed positions in the new government were 
former NGO leaders who had been included in the earlier process. This 
meant they had a thorough understanding of plea bargaining and were 
willing and able to continue on with the existing reforms. 
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c. Specific Legislative Provisions 
i. Seriousness of the Charge 
Some countries specifically limit the use of plea bargaining or abbreviated 
trials to less serious offenses.  This approach may make sense in countries 
where much of the court over-crowding is due to less serious offenses.  It may 
also be useful in countries where the public is concerned about excessive 
leniency in more serious crimes.  As has been discussed, countries that have 
introduced plea bargaining via more serious and high profile cases, such as 
corruption cases or war crimes, have faced negative public reactions and, 
often, from the legal community itself. Limiting pleas to lower-level offenses 
may help reduce perceptions that pleas allow powerful elites to escape justice 
through corruption or influence.  
 
ii. Potential Penalties 
Although it is possible to have plea bargaining without using alternative, non-
jail sentences, there are good reasons to introduce alternative sentences.xxiv    
Using alternative sanctions can help to relieve overcrowded jails and prisons, 
improving human rights conditions.  Alternative sanctions may also be more 
effective in preventing recidivism and helping defendants to address 
whatever problem led to the commission of the crime.  They may be seen as 
more “fair” and help to build trust and legitimacy in the formal legal system. 
For example, fines or community service may be better received by the public 
than prison for less serious offenses. Alternative sentencing can include fines, 
community service, restitution or compensation, drug or alcohol 
rehabilitation, mental health treatment, probation (either supervised by a 
probation officer or directly by the court), and suspended prison sentences.xxv   
 
While the ability to offer sentences other than jail time can be a benefit of 
plea bargaining it carries with it certain risks. As the examples in Georgia and 
Nigeria illustrate, introducing alternative sentencing at the same time as plea 
bargaining can lead to plea bargains being widely seen as another form of 
corruption.  Ideally, alternative, non-custodial sentences should be 
introduced into a legal system well in advance of plea bargains. This can help 
to prevent the general public from viewing these two changes as connected to 
each other.  
 
If it is not possible to introduce alternative sentencing before introducing 
plea bargaining, policymakers can take steps to off-set the negative 
consequences of introducing these changes concurrently.  One option is to 
have a public information campaign that explains plea bargaining and 
alternative sentencing.  Another is for the prosecuting agency to promulgate 
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clear guidelines explaining when non-custodial sentences will be offered as 
part of a plea deal, and to stick to those guidelines in practice.  Guidelines can 
help to bring greater transparency to the process, which can help to prevent 
perceptions that non-custodial sentences are used only for defendants who 
make pay-offs or who have powerful connections.  It is also important to 
make it clear where fine payments go. A lack of transparency around fines 
risks perceptions that fines end up in the judge or prosecutor’s pocket, or that 
pleas are being used simply as a source of revenue for the state 
 
iii. Requiring Defense Counsel 
Most post-conflict countries struggle to guarantee the right to a lawyer to 
those facing criminal charges.  Despite this challenge, countries that have 
more recently introduced plea bargaining, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbia, guarantee the right to a defense lawyer in the plea bargaining 
provisions of the criminal procedure code.  The challenge is making sure this 
is a right in practice as well as under the law.  Legislative drafters and 
policymakers should be aware of on-going problems with guaranteeing the 
right to a lawyer and consider addressing funding or other issues that may be 
the underlying reasons defendants lack access to a lawyer. 
 
iv. Confidentiality of Plea Negotiations 
One concern for defendants in deciding whether or not to engage in plea 
bargaining is how that might be used against them if they ultimately do not 
conclude a deal and proceed forward to trial.  Defendants may be concerned 
that the fact that they asked for a plea bargain or that they or their lawyer 
engaged in back and forth negotiations with the prosecutor regarding a 
possible plea of guilty could be introduced as evidence against them in the 
trial.  This could be a particular concern for defendants who have not made 
any incriminating statements to the police and do not want the fact of a plea 
negotiation to be used as a type of incriminating statement in subsequent 
court proceedings.  Evidence codes in the United States routinely prohibit 
any evidence involving case settlement discussions being introduced at trial 
(in both civil and criminal cases).  Slovenia addressed this concern and 
specifically wrote into their Criminal Procedure Act a provision whereby if 
the prosecution and the defense do not reach an agreement than all 
documents from these negotiations are excluded from the files.xxvi  The goal 
of such legislative provisions is to encourage negotiation to resolve cases as it 
protects both sides from having to worry that this information will be used at 
trial.   
 
v. Role of the Judge 
Plea bargaining rules generally require judges to approve the plea deal.  Some 
require that judges evaluate the evidence to determine that there is a factual 
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basis for the plea.  In countries where judges have traditionally been 
subservient to prosecutors and where prosecutors have wielded more power, 
writing specific provisions into the law to give judges more power in plea 
bargaining can help to make the judge’s role clear.  However, as with other 
aspects of plea bargaining, it may take time before judges start to assert more 
independence regardless of whether the law calls for it. 
 
vi. Limit what can be Negotiated 
When the Republic of Georgia first introduced plea bargaining, human rights 
groups and international organizations criticized the Georgian government 
for using plea bargains to coerce defendants to give up their right to file 
torture complaints in exchange for reduced sentences.xxvii The government 
responded to these criticisms by amending Article 679(1)(7)(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code to make it “inadmissible to conclude a plea 
agreement if it limits the defendant’s constitutional rights to request criminal 
prosecution against persons involved in torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment of the defendant.” The 2005 amendments to Article 679(3)(2)(1)of 
the CPC also required the court to “hear directly from the defendant” that he 
or she has “not been subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment by a 
police officer or other law enforcement representative.” Practices reportedly 
improved after this amendment.xxviii  Given this experience, legislative 
drafters might consider adding a provision into the law to prevent plea deals 
being contingent on waiving complaints of human rights violations including 
torture and ill-treatment. 
 
Another possible limit, as discussed above, might be for plea bargaining 
legislation to specifically prohibit plea deals that refer cases to customary 
justice processes.  Alternatively, legislative drafters may consider limiting the 
types of cases that can be referred to less serious cases, such as theft cases, 
and, where cases are referred, to specifically require oversight by the court to 
ensure that the customary justice tribunal respects the rights of defendants in 
both the process and the punishment.   
 
vii. Role of the Victim 
Some countries require a level of victim involvement in plea bargains. 
Georgia, under Article 679(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code, requires the 
victim be notified of any plea deal, but does not require that the victim agree 
to the deal. Russia goes further, requiring under Article 314(6) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, that the victim agree to the defendant resolving the 
case through an abbreviated trial.  On the other extreme are many 
jurisdictions within the United States that do not require the victim to be 
notified in any way before or after the plea bargain.   
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In deciding whether to require victim notification, legislative drafters and 
policymakers should consider what role victims are given in criminal 
prosecutions under existing law. Where victims play a more active role or 
have broader rights it may be appropriate to allow them a corresponding role 
in the plea bargaining process. Another consideration in deciding whether 
victims should be notified is the possible impact on public opinion.  The 
absence of a notification requirement could be seen as another example of a 
lack of transparency and accountability in the criminal justice system.   
Finally, lawmakers should look at practical considerations such as the 
difficulties communicating with victims due to poor infrastructure.  If basic 
communication is difficult, requiring victim notification or agreement before 
concluding a plea deal, could create additional delays in the process.  In these 
circumstances it might be better to require victim notification after the plea 
deal is concluded, if at all.  
 
Requiring victim agreement, as Russia does with abbreviated trials, can 
create a number of problems including delays in contacting the victim and 
disparate treatment of defendants depending on victim agreement.  
Requiring victim approval could also create a situation where victims are 
subjected to pressure or coercion to secure their agreement.   This could be of 
particular concern in organized crime cases or cases with more vulnerable 
victims, such as sexual assaults.  
 
d. Publication and Publicizing 
After a country passes new plea bargaining legislation for the new law should 
be published so that legal professionals including judges, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers have easy access to the complete text.  In some countries this 
can be done electronically.  In other countries, hard copies of the new law 
should be distributed.  If there are newspapers, including legal newspapers, 
the text of the new law should be published in the newspaper.  This should be 
done before the new law enters into force. 
 
In addition, before the new law enters into force, a public information 
campaign should publicize plea bargaining to the general public.  The public 
information campaign should at a minimum explain what plea bargaining is 
and the rules are surrounding its use. This can help to reduce or avoid 
problems of widespread public distrust of plea bargaining.   The process of 
publicizing the new law should include a wide variety of media outlets 
including radio, television, print media, and social media.  Often the best way 
to explain a new law is with individual stories.  Depending on the country, 
this could mean giving examples of defendants who have languished for years 
in pre-trial detention for minor offenses and how plea bargaining can address 
these kinds of human rights violations.   
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Efforts to publicize the new law should address current public attitudes 
towards the formal justice system and try to address any expected negative 
reactions to plea bargaining.  This may mean directly addressing concerns 
about the informal justice sector and how it will work with plea bargaining.   
Post-conflict countries may also have to respond to negative public attitudes 
towards plea bargaining shaped by the use of plea bargaining in international 
war crimes tribunals.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the domestic War Crimes Chambers 
used plea bargaining before it was introduced more broadly.  Significant 
portions of the public viewed the plea bargained sentences in war crimes 
cases as too lenient.  There was also public concern that the guilty pleas were 
insincere and that defendants were taking an easy way out by not fully 
acknowledging their crimes when they plead guilty.  Some of the victims were 
upset that they were not consulted in the process.   
 
VII. Monitoring and Adjustment 
a. Monitoring 
Monitoring should be a part of any criminal justice reform process.  The only 
way to know if a law is being implemented as intended, or what might need 
to be amended, or what training might be useful is through monitoring the 
actual processes.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a clear example of the value of 
comprehensive monitoring. The Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe wrote a series of monitoring reports that gave legal professionals 
and policymakers a clearer picture of how plea bargaining was being 
practiced, and identified areas of concern such as lack of access to lawyers 
and a frequent lack of meaningful negotiation in the process.xxix Having this 
kind of information will allow for better recommendations to improve pleas 
in law and practice, enabling them to have their intended beneficial effects.   
 
Oftentimes post-conflict countries, because of financial or human resource 
issues, cannot conduct comprehensive monitoring and do not collect good 
data about the functioning of their court systems.  If this is the situation, rule 
of law development assistance providers should focus on creating monitoring 
programs, assuming that conditions are stable and the monitors will not be 
put in harm’s way or targeted. Good monitoring depends on a number of 
factors, including strong knowledge of the local law, developing a group of 
local monitors, and a long-term commitment so that the monitoring is not a 
brief process, but extends over many years.xxx  
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As has been stated, plea bargaining is often part of a larger package of 
criminal procedure reforms. It will therefore rarely make sense to monitor 
plea bargaining on its own.  Instead, the court system, NGOs, and 
international assistance providers who are conducting monitoring should 
include plea bargaining as part of a larger trial monitoring program. 
Monitoring programs can focus on particular parts of the criminal process, or 
how criminal cases are processed from beginning to end, collecting data on 
three key aspects; basic information on whether and how a law is being 
implemented, whether the law is being implemented as written, and whether 
implementation of the law violates the rights of those involved in the court 
process.  
 
Court monitoring projects on plea bargaining have collected information on 
how frequently plea bargaining is used; the original charges filed and the 
resulting charges and sentence; whether and what non-custodial alternative 
sentences are used; how long it takes for a case to be resolved through plea 
bargaining; and whether plea agreements are used to gain witness 
cooperation. Information gathered should also make note of the jurisdiction 
of each case, to allow evaluators to compare implementation across 
jurisdictions and consistency in sentencing.   
 
Past trial monitoring programs have identified several human rights 
concerns that emerged as new plea bargaining laws were put into practice. 
These may serve as a starting point for trial monitors, however it is important 
to remember that violations are not the result plea bargaining alone, but from 
the specifics of plea bargaining laws and the larger legal system and culture. 
For these reasons it is important that court monitors are familiar with the 
vulnerabilities of the relevant plea bargaining laws and the legal system, and 
carefully monitor plea deals for all potential human rights violations.  
Common rights violations have included; failure to provide legal counsel to 
the accused; failure by defense counsel to meaningfully advocate for their 
client; failure by the judge to ensure that the plea is voluntary, that the guilty 
plea is supported by sufficient evidence and that the plea deal is fair; failure 
by the judge to maintain the presumption of innocence; judges pressuring 
defendants to accept plea agreements; and failure to notify victims when 
required by law.  
 
Beyond traditional court monitoring, past initiatives introducing plea 
bargaining make clear that it is important to monitor public opinion on the 
use of pleas. Identifying negative public reactions early, and taking steps to 
counter them either by offering more information on the plea process, or by 
altering practice or the law itself can help minimize further damage to trust 
in the legal system. 
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Depending on the circumstances, it might make sense to not release all 
monitoring reports to the public.  Instead, it may be helpful to have at least 
one stream of reports circulated to a smaller number of professionals within 
the system and to relevant aid providers.  In the Republic of Georgia closed 
monitoring allowed for more critical reports that gave professionals in the 
system the ability to work “behind the scenes” recommending further 
legislative changes without alienating justice actors by exposing the system’s 
faults to the public. The resulting reforms were helpful in improving how the 
process worked and in protecting defense rights.   At the same time as the 
closed process, other organizations conducted an “open” monitoring 
program. This second stream of reports ensured the public also had access to 
information about how the courts were working. 
 
b. Adjustment 
As was discussed, the best way to determine if a newly adopted plea 
bargaining law is working as intended is through monitoring.  Based on 
information gathered through monitoring, there are several types of 
“adjustments” that might be made after a plea bargaining law is introduced.  
The first may be additional legislative reform.  Countries that have more 
recently adopted plea bargaining, such as Georgia, have amended their laws 
multiple times to correct problems in implementation and with the laws 
themselves.  As circumstances within a country change, the need to amend 
the law may also arise. The need for adjustments may be an additional reason 
to avoid introducing pleas in serious or high profile cases. Restricting pleas to 
lower-stakes cases, at least initially, may limit negative public opinion of 
pleas as initial challenges are addressed.  
 
In addition to further legislative reform, there may be other possible ways to 
better implement the law.  For example, in Serbia, a roundtable with 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges and government officials was held to 
discuss why the plea bargaining law was not being implemented.  Other 
countries have followed up with training for specific groups, such as judges or 
defense lawyers.xxxi Any time a law is passed that introduces a fundamental 
change in the legal process there will need to be training to be sure legal 
professionals and judges are aware of the change and to help them to learn 
whatever additional skills they might need to adapt to the change.  As has 
been discussed, plea bargaining can represent a significant change in the 
legal culture of a country.  Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers may all 
benefit from training on how it works and on basic negotiation skills.   
 
However, training alone will not dislodge strongly held cultural biases 
against changing practices or adopting practices that contradict other values. 
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Therefore, rule of law assistance providers should invest the time and 
resources into a training program only after a full assessment concludes that 
there is value in conducting the training. Rule of law assistance providers 
should also give careful consideration to the issue of who will conduct the 
training. If the goal is to achieve local “buy-in” to the new law, the majority of 
the trainers need to be from the country in question and should be trainers 
the audience will take seriously. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Plea bargaining may help post-conflict countries to better manage their 
criminal justice systems by clearing out case backlogs and decreasing the 
numbers of people in pre-trial detention.  However, policy-makers, lawyers, 
legislators, and rule of law assistance providers should understand that plea 
bargaining is a potentially complex change to a criminal justice system and 
may require serious shifts in the legal culture.  Plea bargaining may magnify 
existing problems in the criminal justice system, such as lack of access to 
defense lawyers, corruption or a politicized judiciary.  For this reason, plea 
bargaining is not a process to rush to adopt but is instead a reform that calls 
for careful consideration.  This consideration should include assessing the 
goals behind adopting plea bargaining and the current state of the criminal 
justice system.  Policymakers should also assess public attitudes towards the 
criminal justice system and how plea bargaining may contribute to building 
trust in the formal justice system.  As some of the examples highlighted above 
illustrate, policymakers should not underestimate the potential to do harm by 
introducing plea bargaining in a way that reinforces existing negative public 
attitudes towards the formal criminal justice system.  For this reason, 
policymakers may want to consider the option of introducing a shortened 
process, such as abbreviated trials, that may avoid reinforcing negative public 
attitudes towards the formal justice system.  
 
Ideally, the process of considering whether to adopt plea bargaining should 
include a broad range of interested stakeholders and consider various 
approaches to plea bargaining.  Among the key questions to keep in mind are 
whether plea bargaining should be limited to sentence bargaining or include 
charge bargaining; whether plea bargaining should be available for all crimes 
or a select group; whether the law should limit what can be negotiated as part 
of a plea bargain; whether to require defense attorneys and at what stages; 
what is the role of the judge in plea bargaining; and what is the role of the 
victim.  If a country decides to adopt plea bargaining, the process should 
include publishing and publicizing the law.  Once the law enters into force, it 
is important to monitor how or if it is used.  Without monitoring, countries 
that adopt plea bargaining will not have clear data to guide additional 
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legislative action to adjust the plea bargaining law to address problems with 
its implementation.  Countries should not expect plea bargaining to lead to 
changes overnight.  As the example of Georgia illustrates, it may take nearly a 
decade for plea bargaining to enter into wide-spread use.  However, in many 
countries plea bargaining has helped to improve the criminal justice system 
by providing better efficiency, enabling prosecutors to use it as a tool for 
complex prosecutions, and by allowing for more creative sentencing.  
Ultimately, under the right circumstances, plea bargaining can contribute to 
a stronger criminal justice system and better access to justice. 
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